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THE LIMITS OF READING LAW IN THE
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT CASES
Kevin C. Walsh*
INTRODUCTION
One of the most highly lauded legacies of Justice Scalia’s decades-long
tenure on the Supreme Court was his leadership of a movement to tether
statutory interpretation more closely to statutory text. His dissents in the
Affordable Care Act cases—National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius1 and King v. Burwell 2—demonstrate both the nature and the limits of his
success in that effort.
These were two legal challenges, one constitutional and the other statutory, that threatened to bring down President Obama’s signature legislative
achievement, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. Both times the
Court swerved away from a direct collision. And both times Justice Scalia
accused the Court majority—led by Chief Justice Roberts—of twisting the
statutory text.3
Justice Scalia was right about the twistifications. But that does not mean
he was right to condemn them both. Sometimes the governing law of interpretation calls on judges to adopt an interpretation other than the one that
most straightforwardly follows from the application of standard interpretive
conventions to statutory text.4
© 2017 Kevin C. Walsh. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Essay in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I thank the editors of the
Notre Dame Law Review and participants in this symposium on Justice Scalia’s legacy in the
federal courts.
1 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The dissent in this case was a joint dissent authored at least
in part by Justice Scalia. Id. at 2642 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., & Alito, J., dissenting). From the language of the statutory interpretation section, it appears that Justice
Scalia was at least a contributing author, and perhaps the sole author, of that section.
2 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
3 Id. at 2496–507 (Scalia, J., dissenting); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2642–77 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
4 The phrase “law of interpretation” has recently been in wider circulation as the title
of an insightful article about the law of interpretation. See William Baude & Stephen E.
Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1079 (2017). By using the phrase, I do
not mean to adopt all of the particulars of Baude’s and Sachs’s outlook. I do mean,
1997
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NFIB v. Sebelius was just such a case. The Supreme Court had to choose
between two interpretations of a provision regarding mandatory insurance
coverage.5 The most straightforward interpretation—as a requirement to
have the right kind of insurance, backed up by a financial penalty for noncompliance—would have resulted in a holding of unconstitutionality.6 A textually inferior interpretation—as a tax on not having the requisite
insurance—would have avoided such a holding.7 Under the Court’s precedent governing that kind of choice, the Court was required to choose the
constitutionally salvific interpretation—even over the textually superior
one—as long as it was “reasonable” and “fairly possible” to read it that way.8
And it was.
In King v. Burwell, by contrast, the law of interpretation did not authorize the Justices to opt for the textually inferior interpretation. Chief Justice
Roberts found ambiguity in unambiguous statutory text and then resolved
that ambiguity by reference to an interpretation that would make the “legislative plan” work.9
Because Chief Justice Roberts avoided explicit reference to legislative
purpose and legislative history—two hallmarks of the “bad old days” before
the rise of Scalian textualism10—he was constrained to generate ambiguity
through textual analysis. And it is precisely because of this constraint that
careful opinion readers can see where his reasoning comes up short. This is
a testimony to Justice Scalia’s success in leading the Court away from a more
purposive approach toward a more textualist approach. But Justice Scalia
and his textualism were still losers in King. Scalia’s need to dissent in that
case shows not only the limits of textualism’s ascendancy, but also the need
for a sounder jurisprudential footing for textualist interpretive practice.
The interpretive intentionalism elaborated by Richard Ekins in recent
years would have provided a jurisprudential foundation that enabled engagement of Roberts on his own terms.11 A comparison of Ekins’s account of
legislative intent with Roberts’s conception of the legislative plan enables one
to understand why the plan legislated by Congress—not the altered plan
though, to affiliate my usage with Baude’s and Sachs’s insofar as they use “law of interpretation” to describe a body of customary general law.
5 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–98.
6 Id. at 2593.
7 Id. at 2593–98. To come within Congress’s authority, it was necessary for the
Supreme Court not only to treat the mandate as a tax, but also to conclude that it was not a
direct tax requiring apportionment by population. Id. at 2598–99.
8 Id. at 2593–97.
9 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2489–96 (2015).
10 See Paul D. Clement, Remarks at Proceedings of the Bar and Officers of the
Supreme Court of the United States (Nov. 4, 2016), https://www.supremecourt.gov/pdf/
ScaliaBarMeetingRemarks_v6.pdf (describing an interaction at oral argument regarding
the “bad old days” of implying causes of action as having ended when Justice Scalia joined
the bench).
11 See generally RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT (2012).
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advanced by the Obama Administration and accepted by the Court majority—should have been treated as authoritative in King.12
A jurisprudentially grounded theory of interpretation—whether textualist, intentionalist, pragmatist, or what have you—matters in a peculiarly
important way in actual adjudication. It does not legally control, at least not
directly. The law of interpretation does. But the law of interpretation is
largely unwritten and largely uncodified. It yields no uniquely correct directive in some cases. And there are more of these “hard cases” the further one
goes into the courts and up the appellate hierarchy.
In these hard cases, a jurisprudentially grounded theory of interpretation orients attention and choice. The orientation it provides is just that. It
is about the object of interpretation, more about interpretive outlook than
algorithm. And its implementation is never pure, in the sense of being
unconstrained by prior authoritative settlements and institutional considerations. But by providing an account of the central case or ideal type of legislation and interpretation and adjudication, jurisprudentially grounded theory
not only orients interpreters in particular cases. It also explains how changes
in the law of interpretation may be justified and provides a basis for evaluating changes over time.
This Essay’s exposition proceeds in three Parts. The first presents NFIB
v. Sebelius as an illustration of the law of interpretation—as distinct from any
particular theory of interpretation—at work. The decisive judicial activity was
“interpretation” in only a loose, nonfocal use of the term. The second Part
examines King v. Burwell. The dueling opinions in this case show how the
success of Scalian textualism in practice has left it theoretically impoverished
in answering appeals to the legislative plan on their own terms. The third
Part introduces the intentionalism elaborated by Richard Ekins as an
improved jurisprudential foundation for an approach to statutory interpretation in theory that dovetails significantly with Justice Scalia’s textualism in
practice. I conclude with the contention that Justice Scalia’s leadership
moved the law of interpretation closer to the central case of statutory interpretation appropriate for our constitutional order. He thereby lawfully
improved that law over the course of his judicial tenure even though—over
time—this involved transforming rather than simply transmitting the law of
interpretation that had been handed down to him.
I. THE LAW

OF

INTERPRETATION

AT

WORK

IN

NFIB V. SEBELIUS

The Supreme Court’s legal assessment of 26 U.S.C. § 5000A in NFIB v.
Sebelius shows how specific guidance supplied by the law of interpretation can
override the orientation supplied by a general theory of statutory interpretation. The statutory text in question—§ 5000A—was the home for the part of
the Affordable Care Act commonly known as the individual mandate.13 This
was a mechanism for inducing insurance coverage. Just how to understand
12
13

See infra Part III.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580.
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or describe that mechanism is the interpretive issue that divided the Court.
Was the “individual mandate” a requirement enforced by a penalty for noncompliance, or was it instead a tax on going without the required coverage?
The driver of this interpretive inquiry was a prior constitutional analysis.
If § 5000A was a requirement enforced via a financial penalty for noncompliance, it would be unconstitutional because it would be outside of Congress’s
regulatory authority under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper
Clauses.14 But if § 5000A was only a tax on going without the required insurance, it would be within Congress’s tax-laying authority (as long as it was not
a direct tax).15
Chief Justice Roberts, writing for a majority of the Court, went with the
“just a tax” interpretation.16 This was not “[t]he most straightforward reading,” Chief Justice Roberts openly acknowledged, but it was a “reasonable
one.”17 And that was enough.
Everyone knew there was a thumb on the interpretive scale; both the
majority and dissenting opinions acknowledged as much. The requirementenforced-by-penalty interpretation would result in constitutional invalidation,
while the tax interpretation could bring the provision within Congress’s taxing power (as long as it was not a direct tax). This state of affairs triggered
the principle that “every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in
order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”18 The interpretive question
before the Court, then, was not whether the saving construction “is the most
natural interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it is a ‘fairly possible’
one.”19 For its part, the dissent agreed with the “fairly possible” standard as
well.20 The differences came in application.
Chief Justice Roberts’s investigation of whether it was “fairly possible” to
treat § 5000A as a tax drew a “functional approach” from Supreme Court
precedent policing the tax/penalty line.21 This approach looks at how the
provision functions rather than how Congress labeled it. Roberts identified a
number of features that made it “fairly possible” to view § 5000A as a tax: the
amount due was close to, and sometimes lower than, the price of insurance
(in contrast with a prohibitively high penalty masquerading as a “tax”); there
was no scienter requirement (in contrast with many requirements backed up
by penalties); and the IRS was prohibited from using certain enforcement
tools, including criminal prosecutions (in contrast with other requirements
labeled as “taxes” but held to be penalties).22 Roberts also noted that the
14 Id. at 2584–93.
15 Id. at 2593–98.
16 The provision’s constitutionality then depended on the Court’s further determination that the tax imposed was not a “direct tax” that would have had to have been apportioned a certain way. Id. at 2598.
17 Id. at 2593–94.
18 Id. at 2594 (quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
19 Id. (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)).
20 See id. at 2651 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., Alito, J., dissenting).
21 Id. at 2595 (majority opinion).
22 Id. at 2595–96.
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Court had previously upheld many taxes that were also designed to influence
conduct.23
The joint dissent had a number of strong counterarguments. Perhaps
the strongest was that § 5000A had separate exemptions from the insurance
requirement and from the financial penalty, suggesting that the two had distinct legal effect (rather than being combined to operate as a tax on not
having compliant insurance).24 Another strong argument was that the Court
had never previously taken something denominated a “penalty” and treated
it as a tax; the functional approach from the Court’s precedent had only
been used to take something denominated a “tax” and treat it as a disguised
penalty.25
The joint dissent’s problem was that, once there was a foothold in precedent for a functional approach to decide how to characterize something as
either a tax or a penalty, the “fairly possible” standard was not a difficult one
to meet. Indeed, the tax-like features of § 5000A had led some observers
(including me), and some lower court judges (including Judge Kavanaugh of
the D.C. Circuit, for example), to believe that the Court might not have been
permitted to get to the merits because the challenge was blocked by the Tax
Anti-Injunction Act.26
The resolution of the tax/penalty interpretive question in NFIB shows
the limits of any general theory of statutory interpretation in contrast with
specific controlling requirements from the law of interpretation. The decisive principle of interpretation in NFIB was the very low “fairly possible”
threshold that the “just a tax” interpretation had to cross in order to become
the interpretation the Justices were required to adopt. That principle is an
implementing rule for a constitutional-doubt canon that Justice Scalia and
his coauthor, Bryan Garner, endorse in Reading Law.27 But it is not really a
rule for “reading law” as much as it is for determining the legal effect of
statutory language through application of a legal principle.28
In his earlier book, A Matter of Interpretation, Justice Scalia criticized “substantive” canons like the constitutional-doubt canon as placing “a thumb of
23 Id. at 2596.
24 Id. at 2653 (Scalia, J., Kennedy, J., Thomas, J., & Alito, J., dissenting).
25 Id.
26 See, e.g., Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 22 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting); Kevin C. Walsh, The Anti-Injunction Act, Congressional Inactivity, and Pre-Enforcement
Challenges to § 5000A of the Tax Code, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 823, 824 (2012). In NFIB, the
Supreme Court held that the Tax Anti-Injunction Act did not pose a barrier because, in
contrast with the functional approach for the constitutional avoidance analysis, the “penalty” label chosen by Congress controlled that statutory analysis. 132 S. Ct. at 2582–84.
27 See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF
LEGAL TEXTS 247–51 (2012).
28 Id. at 249 (contending that a “more plausible basis for the rule” than as an assessment of probable meaning “is that it represents judicial policy—a judgment that statutes
ought not to tread on questionable constitutional grounds unless they do so clearly, or perhaps a judgment that courts should minimize the occasions on which they confront and
perhaps contradict the legislative branch”).
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indeterminate weight” on the interpretive scale.29 He had a point; the canon
does place a thumb on the scale. “Indeterminate weight” is too strong,
though. The Court’s precedents setting the “every reasonable construction”
and “fairly possible” standards provided some guidance regarding the weight
in NFIB. The case was not one in which the Justices first had to decide
whether the statute was ambiguous, which is a matter about which reasonable
judges can often disagree.30 Rather, the Justices were told to see if the saving
construction was “reasonable” and “fairly possible.”31 And given all the taxlike characteristics of the required payment, including how it was assessed
and collected, that standard was pretty easily met. If anything, the Supreme
Court’s determination that the challenge in NFIB could go forward despite
the Anti-Injunction Act is more open to criticism than the majority’s determination that it was “fairly possible” to treat § 5000A as imposing a tax. The
constitutional-doubt canon does not derive from a theory of statutory interpretation, but instead from an account of constitutional adjudication or of
constitutional implementation. It is a contingent feature of the constitutional order in the United States, not a necessary feature of every system in
which judges assess the constitutionality of statutes. Whatever objections may
fairly be made to the constitutional-doubt canon as a matter of policy or of
separation of powers law, though, it is reasonably well-established in the law
of interpretation in the United States at present.
As the law of interpretation develops over time, it may even turn out that
NFIB becomes authority for a refinement of the constitutional-doubt canon.
In NFIB v. Sebelius, the canon lowered the cost of developing constitutional
doctrine, and this may be one permissible consideration in evaluating the
constitutional-doubt canon’s fit with the rest of the system. One feature of
the constitutional analysis that none of the opinions mentions, though, is the
way in which the constitutional line transgressed by the mandate-as-requirement was a function of new doctrinal line-drawing with respect to the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. Perhaps the judicial
thumb should be even heavier than usual when the constitutional problem to
be avoided results from a doctrinal line newly drawn in the very same case in
which the constitutional-doubt canon is being applied. Or perhaps not. The
salient point for present purposes is that the right interpretive rules are a
function not simply of interpretive theory but of law, and the ingredients
include separation of powers considerations specific to the judicial function
in addition to more standard considerations related to legislation and
interpretation.

29 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 28
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997).
30 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118,
2134–44 (2016) (reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)).
31 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (first quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932);
and then quoting Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657 (1895)).
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KING V. BURWELL

In contrast with NFIB v. Sebelius, King v. Burwell is a case in which the law
of interpretation did not authorize abandonment of the most straightforward
reading of the statutory text. The back-and-forth between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia in this case shows the substantial advances made by
textualism as well as its vulnerability from its lack of conceptual resources to
confront arguments from legislative intent on their own turf.
The interpretive question in King was whether an insurance exchange
established by the federal government as a fallback or stand-in for a stateestablished insurance exchange counted as an “Exchange established by the
State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031].”32 If such federally-created exchanges did
not count as “established by the State” within the meaning of this provision,
participants in such exchanges would not be eligible to receive tax credits to
subsidize the purchase of health insurance coverage.33
It would be more tedious than useful to summarize here the many arguments on both sides of the interpretive dispute. Even a capsule description
of the basic orientation of the opinions risks misleading. But it is still possible to get a basic idea of the differing approaches of Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Scalia by focusing on a few considerations. First, Justice Scalia
thought that the statutory language “established by the State” was unambiguous.34 Chief Justice Roberts, by contrast, found the provision ambiguous
based on a variety of considerations arising out of relationships of this text
with other pieces of statutory text.35 Second, Roberts resolved the ambiguity
in favor of an understanding that included federally-established exchanges.36
Although Scalia thought there was no ambiguity to resolve, he advanced
arguments to show why Congress might reasonably have limited the tax credits only to state exchanges.37 Third, Chief Justice Roberts did not defer to
the IRS or any other agency regarding the availability of tax credits.38 Applying what has been dubbed the Major Questions Doctrine, Chief Justice Roberts determined that Congress did not intend the availability or unavailability
of tax credits on federally-established exchanges to depend on agency
interpretation.39
In my view, Justice Scalia was right. There was no ambiguity to resolve.
It is a testimony to the strides made by Scalia’s brand of textualism that Chief
Justice Roberts invoked neither legislative history nor “purpose” when wrestling with the seemingly unambiguous statutory text. But Roberts was still
able to bring functional considerations and practical consequences into his
32 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 26 U.S.C.
§ 36B(b)(2)(A) (2012)).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 2497 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
35 Id. at 2492 (majority opinion).
36 Id. at 2496.
37 Id. at 2504 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
38 Id. at 2489 (majority opinion).
39 Id.
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framing of the issues and subsequent analysis. The organizing idea of his
opinion for the Court is that “[a] fair reading of legislation demands a fair
understanding of the legislative plan.”40 And while it appears as if the statutory analysis begins with the text, the analysis-opening statement that “[w]e
begin with the text” does not show up until page nine of a twenty-one page
slip opinion.41 The preceding portion’s background framing of the facts and
the law nestles the textual analysis within a broader understanding of the
“series of interlocking reforms designed to expand coverage in the individual
health insurance market.”42
Chief Justice Roberts never quite says it, but the sense that seemingly
pervades his opinion for the Court is that the legislators who voted for the
Affordable Care Act simply could not have wanted participants in the federally-established exchanges to be ineligible for tax credits. He comes close at
times, but never speaks in terms of subjective intent. In generating the purported ambiguity of “established by the State,” for example, Roberts uses statutory text to suggest that “the Act indicates that State and Federal Exchanges
should be the same,” which they obviously would not be if tax credits “were
available only on State Exchanges.”43 And in resolving the purported ambiguity in favor of the more permissive reading allowing tax credits on federally-established exchanges, Roberts invokes precedent stating that “[a]
provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the
remainder of the statutory scheme . . . because only one of the permissible
meanings produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest of the
law.”44
Justice Scalia’s dissent includes a portion that persuasively answers the
claim that allowing tax credits only on exchanges established by the State is
incompatible with the rest of the law.45 “No law pursues just one purpose at
all costs,” Scalia wrote, and “the Affordable Care Act displays a congressional
preference for state participation in the establishment of Exchanges.”46
Although the Court’s precedent does authorize judicial correction of drafting errors, that is not a free-floating power. It kicks in only “when it is
patently obvious to a reasonable reader that a drafting mistake has
occurred.”47 That standard was nowhere close to being met. Nor was the
statutory language eligible for an absurdity-based escape from the obvious
import of the enacted text. That path is open to the interpreter only when
the “absurd result” is “a consequence ‘so monstrous, that all mankind would,
40 Id. at 2496.
41 King v. Burwell, No. 14–114, slip op. at 9 (U.S. June 25, 2015).
42 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2485.
43 Id. at 2491.
44 Id. at 2492 (quoting United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs.,
Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988)).
45 Id. at 2502–05.
46 Id. at 2504.
47 Id. at 2504–05.
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without hesitation, unite in rejecting the application.’ ”48 Because it was
“entirely plausible that tax credits were restricted to state Exchanges deliberately—for example, in order to encourage States to establish their own
Exchanges”—this demanding standard for departure from the text was not
satisfied.49
In contrast with the applicable law of interpretation in NFIB v. Sebelius,
which required a thumb on the scale in favor of the saving construction from
the outset, the law of interpretation in King v. Burwell required judges to
keep their hands off unless the purported drafting mistake or absurdity rose
to a very high level of unreasonableness. Like the constitutional-doubt
canon, these rules authorize departure from the most straightforward reading of the statutory text. But their thresholds for departure are very high,
and should not have been crossed in King.
The idea that the statute was ambiguous in a manner fit for reasonable
resolution by an agency required something of a lower threshold showing.
But Chief Justice Roberts was right that the availability of tax credits on federally-established exchanges was not something that Congress left for agency
resolution. He was wrong that the statute actually authorized such credits.
The strength of Justice Scalia’s textualism can be seen in Judge Griffith’s
opinion for the D.C. Circuit in resolving a challenge identical to the one later
resolved by the Supreme Court in King.50 Judge Griffith refused to ignore
the statutory text “in favor of assumptions about the risks that Congress
would or would not tolerate—assumptions doubtlessly influenced by hindsight.”51 This move would in effect substitute the court’s judgment for Congress’s, but “[t]he role of th[e] [c]ourt is to apply the statute as it is written—
even if we think some other approach might ‘accor[d] with good policy.’ ”52
This D.C. Circuit decision contrasts with the Fourth Circuit decision
reviewed by the Supreme Court in King.53 In that opinion, Judge Gregory
acknowledged the strength of the textual argument, but concluded that the
statute was ambiguous and resolved the case based on agency deference
under Chevron.54 Judge Griffith, by contrast, invoked the Court’s recent
statement that “an agency may not rewrite clear statutory terms to suit its own
sense of how the statute should operate.”55 He then added: “And neither
may we.”56
It is sound practice for readers of judicial opinions to get their guard up
whenever a court invokes Marbury v. Madison to say it is just doing its duty to
48 Id. at 2505 (quoting Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 203 (1819)).
49 Id.
50 Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
51 Id. at 411.
52 Id. (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Burrage v. United
States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 892 (2014)).
53 King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358 (4th Cir. 2014).
54 Id. at 368–72.
55 Halbig, 758 F.3d at 411 (quoting Util. Air Reg. Grp. v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 134 S. Ct.
2427, 2446 (2014)).
56 Id.
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say what the law is. The invocation is sometimes an indication that something else is going on. And so it was when Chief Justice Roberts quoted Marbury in King.57 That quotation came shortly after his quotation of language
from an earlier case cautioning that “[r]eliance on context and structure in
statutory interpretation is a ‘subtle business, calling for great wariness lest
what professes to be mere rendering becomes creation and attempted interpretation of legislation becomes legislation itself.’ ”58 This quotation was cleaned up from its actual context. In it, Justice Frankfurter warned against a
different practice, one that accurately describes the interpretive approach of
the King majority, “wherein meaning is sought to be derived not from specific language but by fashioning a mosaic of significance out of the innuendoes of disjointed bits of a statute.”59
The Justices in the King majority would not have engaged in that enterprise if they had shared Justice Scalia’s confidence in relying on the simple
words “established by the State.”60 In the end, though, there was nothing
“subtle” about the Court’s functional rewriting of the statute. It really seems
best understood as a purposivist enterprise shaped by the conviction that the
statutory language “established by the State” was an oversight that should
have been cleaned up by Congress. In effect, the Court decided to correct a
legislative mistake even while disclaiming that it was doing just that.
III. AN INTENTIONALIST IMPROVEMENT

ON

TEXTUALIST PRACTICE

IN

KING

Justice Scalia’s dissent in King would have been stronger if he had been
able to confront Chief Justice Roberts’s “legislative plan” appeal head-on by
reference to the actual legislative intent that should count for statutory interpretation.61 But Scalian textualism has no place for legislative intent, which
it treats as a dangerous fiction.
Textualist critics of legislative intent are right inasmuch as many who use
the concept get it wrong in a particular way—by viewing it as a kind of aggregate, as the sum of or overlapping content of individual mental states of legislators voting in favor of enacting a proposal. To understand legislative intent
as an aggregate is not the only way to do it, though; nor is it the best. And
the idea of legislative intent is valuable because it helps explain why the act of
legislating is reasonable. Rather than discarding the concept entirely, a better response is to replace a defective concept of legislative intent with a correct one.
The scholarship of Richard Ekins helps show the way. In his book The
Nature of Legislative Intent, Ekins sets forth an approach to statutory interpretation that one reviewer has dubbed “Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could
57 King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
58 Id. at 2495–96 (quoting Palmer v. Massachusetts, 308 U.S. 79, 83 (1939)).
59 Palmer, 308 U.S. at 83.
60 King, 135 S. Ct. at 2496–97 (Scalia, J., Thomas, J., & Alito, J., dissenting).
61 See id. at 2496 (majority opinion).

\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\92-5\NDL505.txt

2017]

the limits of

unknown

READING LAW

Seq: 11

in the aca cases

30-MAY-17

15:04

2007

Love.”62 It is a promising place to start in putting textualist practice on a
firmer jurisprudential footing.
According to Ekins, legislative intent is an actual group intent to take a
particular action that changes the content of the law in response to reasons
for action. The legislature exercises legislative authority through the making
and promulgation of a choice, and interpreters should “aim to understand
the reasoned choice that finds expression in [the legislature’s] intended
meaning.”63 That “intended meaning” is how the legislature “formulates the
set of propositions it intends to introduce into the law.”64
The search for this intended meaning does not call for investigation into
the legislators’ internal mental states, although the intention that counts is
subjective. The intent that Ekins identifies in a particular legislative act is a
function of the standing intent of the legislative body to enact into law the
propositions of law that follow from the enactment of legislative proposals for
action voted on by the legislative body. It is the “fully actual and subjective”65
intention common to all legislators, and not just those in the majority, to act
jointly on the “open proposal” before the legislature as the legislators vote on
it.66 At the same time that Ekins insists on the legislators’ actual subjective
intention regarding the enactment (or not) of the open proposal at the time
of voting, he acknowledges a sense in which the content of the legislative
proposal at the time of voting can “be said to be objective.”67 “What is open
to them,” Ekins writes, “may, at the risk of confusion, be said to be objective,
because the content of the proposal turns on how it is reasonably to be
understood.”68
By supplying more precise content to the idea of legislative intent that
should be operative in statutory interpretation, Ekins’s intentionalism speaks
some of the same language as Chief Justice Roberts in his invocation of the
“legislative plan.”69 At the same time, Ekins’s use of “legislative plan” is more
precisely specified than Roberts’s. Ekins aims the interpreter toward the full
content of the complex means-end relationships within the actual proposal
enacted by the legislators’ votes.
62 See Hillel Y. Levin, Intentionalism Justice Scalia Could Love, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 89
(2015). One reason for this designation is that Ekins argues against judicial reliance on
legislative history. Id. at 96–97. More generally, Ekins’s identification of an objective
understanding of the content of the legislative proposal open for adoption by the legislature coheres with textualists’ insistence on the reasonable import of statutory text at the
time of adoption, considered apart from the subjective perceptions of individual legislators. As we shall see, however, there are aspects of Ekins’s intentionalism that Justice Scalia
would not love. See id. at 97 (discussing Ekins’s limited allowance of “equitable
interpretation”).
63 EKINS, supra note 11, at 247.
64 Id. at 246.
65 Id. at 231.
66 Id. at 271.
67 Id. at 231.
68 Id.
69 Id. at 275.
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As applied to King, it may seem strange that a form of interpretive intentionalism could ground a conclusion that the relevant intended meaning
regarding the availability of tax credits was something that not a single legislator may have subjectively intended at the time of voting. But that may show
only that legislators were not doing their job that well. By voting for or
against the Affordable Care Act, legislators in the House of Representatives
and in the Senate signified by their “yes” or “no” votes an actual intention
that the proposal open for adoption be enacted (or not) into law. Legislators
voting “yes” may also have had the subjective intention that there be additional clean-up of the proposal in a conference committee that never ended
up meeting.70 But they nonetheless all voted for the plan as set forth in the
actual proposal that they voted to enact into law.
Because the object of interpretation for the intentionalism developed by
Ekins is “the reasoned choice that finds expression in [the legislature’s]
intended meaning,” the interpreter should be open to the possibility that the
two diverge.71 That is, “in some exceptional, unforeseen cases the reasoned
choice on which the legislature acts [may come] apart from the legislature’s
intended meaning.”72 Ekins argues that, in such circumstances, “the reasoned choice is authoritative and should be taken to qualify or extend the law
otherwise made out by the intended meaning.”73 The interpreter “should
recognize exceptions or extensions to the statute’s intended meaning in such
cases,” Ekins contends, because “what the legislature acts to make law is the
set of propositions articulated in its intended meaning, taking that meaning
as qualified by reference to its reasoned choice, a qualification which is
apparent in exceptional cases.”74
Now we have come to an aspect of Ekins’s intentionalism that Justice
Scalia would emphatically not love: openness to “equitable interpretation.”75
Depending on how narrowly or broadly one defines the set of circumstances
in which recourse can be had to the reasoned choice behind or underneath
the intended meaning of the legislature’s words, the availability of “equitable
interpretation” could end up giving away much of the interpretive formalism
that Scalian textualism provides.
The most important qualification that Ekins places on the availability of
equitable interpretation is that it be limited to “exceptional, unforeseen
cases.”76 Only in such cases, he contends, “is it possible for intended mean70 See Abbe R. Gluck, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in
the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 78 (2015) (explaining that senators
may have thought that their vote was a preliminary one that would move the legislation to
the House and to a two-chamber conference committee before a final vote by each chamber, but this did not happen because an intervening election reduced the Senate Democrats’ super-majority and the House had to accept the Senate version as final).
71 EKINS, supra note 11, at 247.
72 Id. at 275.
73 Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 275–84.
76 Id. at 275.
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ing and reasoned choice to diverge.”77 It is reasonable, I contend, for the
interpreter to limit “exceptional, unforeseen cases” to those that result from
“[t]he legislative predicament” of needing “to make law despite limited foresight.”78 This qualification would not include mistakes that result from simple inattention to the details of a complex legislative proposal. As Ekins
argues, “it is reasonable to presume that enactments are drafted (and considered, adopted) with the specific intention that the legislature’s intent in
enacting them be sufficiently intelligible to any competent lawyer who reads
them, without reference to the deliberative record.”79 After all, “the intention of the assembly is constituted by the proposal for action that is open to
the legislators and on which they jointly act.”80
This formulation makes clear why “equitable interpretation” would have
been inappropriate in King v. Burwell. The idea that the actual plan voted on
by Congress is one that included tax credits for participants in federally-established exchanges was not a straightforwardly apparent interpretation of the
proposal open for consideration. Legislators may have subjectively intended
to make credits available on federal and state exchanges alike—if they even
subjectively thought about it then at all. But any “competent lawyer” who
examined the open proposal that Congress adopted as the Affordable Care
Act would have recognized that the plan expressed in the legislation would
need to be changed to accomplish that objective.81
The mismatch between legislators’ subjective beliefs about the availability of tax credits and what the legislation actually provided—if mismatch
there was—stemmed from inattention rather than lack of foresight. The
need for a rule about the availability of tax credits was both anticipated by
Congress and addressed in the legislation. Individual legislators may not
have attended to this detail themselves, and none of them may have anticipated the extent to which states would be unwilling to cooperate by setting
up exchanges. But the legal content of the proposal they enacted into law
does not depend on the extent of individual inattention or poor predictions
about the extent to which fallback federal exchanges provided by the legislation would be needed. To paraphrase Chief Justice Roberts, a fair reading of
legislation requires a fair reading of the legislated plan. The Court should
have acted as if Congress had fully accomplished the legislative deed.
CONCLUSION
Whether Chief Justice Roberts or Justice Scalia had more legally sound
opinions in each of the Affordable Care Act cases are ultimately questions of
law, not theory. The same is true for the question whether any of the Justices
are right or wrong in any of the cases they decide. And judges should not
77
78
79
80
81

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 276.
at 270.
at 269–70.
at 270.
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confuse theories of statutory interpretation with the law of statutory interpretation. The proper legal disposition in NFIB v. Sebelius, for example, turned
not on textualism but on the “reasonable” and “fairly possible” standards supplied by precedent implementing the constitutional-doubt canon.82
While the difference between law and theory of law is real, the two are
not always separate. The law of interpretation is largely uncodified and has
pieces that can point in different directions in cases. Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Scalia both accurately quoted precedents on interpretation in
their opinions in King v. Burwell, for instance. In doing so, they were not
only marshaling authorities for resolving that particular case, but also drawing on and building up more general approaches to statutory interpretation.
This is how the law of interpretation develops.
Over the course of his judicial career, Justice Scalia transformed the way
that lawyers and judges approach the enterprise of statutory interpretation.83
Given this remarkable success, is there not something odd about harping
here on dissents from two “big cases” in recent years and advancing a form of
intentionalism as better grounding in theory for securing the advances made
by Justice Scalia’s textualism in practice? Not at all. Indeed, it is a tribute to
Justice Scalia’s legacy that this is exactly how he would have it (though he
would undoubtedly have preferred to have seen his opinions carry the day in
more big cases).
Evaluation of judicial development of the law of interpretation requires
reference both to the actual legal regime in which the judges operate, as well
as central-case or ideal-type accounts of adjudication and interpretation and
legislation appropriate for those regimes. The actual legal regime may
depart from the central case in ways that actors within the system must treat
as authoritative. When that happens, of course, the judge must follow along.
But the choice is not always clear-cut, particularly in cases that end up being
resolved at the Supreme Court of the United States.
The tension between central-case judging and judging within the confines of the separation of powers of one’s actual regime can be seen in both
NFIB v. Sebelius and King v. Burwell. Justice Scalia’s King dissent was correct
because it was closer to the central case of interpretation—relying not on
some gestalt conception of a workable plan, but rather on an understanding
of the legislative proposal open for adoption and then intentionally adopted
into law through the act of voting. The NFIB v. Sebelius interpretation by
Chief Justice Roberts was correct for a different reason. It took the right
output from a straightforward interpretive approach and then placed a heavy
thumb on the scale to yield a different operative understanding. This was a
82 NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594 (2012).
83 Because of Justice Scalia’s intellectual leadership regarding the law of interpretation, “the connection between statutory text and judicial interpretations of it has tightened
substantially . . . . That is no small legacy.” BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., RESOLUTIONS OF THE BAR OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES IN APPRECIATION AND
GRATITUDE FOR THE LIFE, WORK, AND SERVICE OF JUSTICE ANTONIN SCALIA (2016), https://
www.supremecourt.gov/pdf/Scalia_Resolution.pdf.
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departure from the central case of interpretation, but one required by the
applicable law of interpretation.
If the law of interpretation changed for the better on Justice Scalia’s
watch, as I have suggested, that is because it moved closer to the central case
of interpretation. That central case—I have suggested, following Ekins—is
intentionalist, not textualist. This kind of intentionalism in theory, though,
looks a lot like textualism in practice.
The law of interpretation shifts over time. And individual judges can
lead these shifts even while maintaining their obligation to follow the law of
interpretation in making their decisions. That is what Justice Scalia did for
textualism over the course of his judicial career. Yet a return to the “bad old
days” is possible today or tomorrow or the next. The challenge for judge and
theorist alike is to move the practice of statutory interpretation under law
closer to the central case of statutory interpretation today even while staying
within the law of interpretation from yesterday. We know this is possible
because we have seen it done.
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